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The Secularization Problem
I once had the privilege of hearing Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975) lecture on 
the problem of dealing with population concentration in the cities. I had 
never met the famous historian and I remember that I attended with the 
intention of getting a look at him. As it happened, his remarks provided 
me with a number of valuable and helpful insights. He spoke about the 
effect massive concentrations of people have on the spirit of man. The 
pollution problem had not yet achieved the wide recognition it has 
today, and he focussed mainly on how the human spirit could be warped 
by this phenomenon of urban population concentration. Today, the pollu­
tion of the world’s cities has turned our attention away from this even 
graver threat to our humanity. No clue to the solution of the questions 
Toynbee raised has yet been found. The problem is in fact assuming even 
more serious proportions.
In the case of earthquakes, the closest attention is paid to slight changes 
in the earth’s crust. Formidable efforts are marshalled to foretell an ap­
proaching calamity. But when it comes to cracks and depressions of the
♦ This is the second chapter of author’s Shinran to Gendai (Shinran Today), pub­
lished in 1974 by the ChDokoronsha, Tokyo. In the preface, the author writes: ‘‘Through 
the reflection on the awakening and deepening of his faith in the encounter with 
H6nen, Shinran’s religious life shaped a logic with a depth all its own. In this book, 
I explain, through Shinran’s works, this ‘logic of Faith-Joy,* and discuss the relations 
between Shinran’s thought, the problem of secularization in contemporary civilization 
whereby person to person relationships arc being lost, and the existential philosophies 
and theologies which try to face these problems.”
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spirit, it is as if everybody has determined to take no notice of the danger 
until the catastrophe is upon us. And it could well be that the most culpable 
pollution problem is that we have steered the issue away from the spiritual 
level, indicated by Toynbee, to the realm of the merely material.
Some might dismiss Toynbee’s remarks as the fanciful musings of a 
historian. But the impression I came away with was that I had come into 
contact with a true historian in the line of Albert Schweitzer (1875-1965), 
a man who, through the historical study of the past, had managed to extend 
severalfold his range of vision into the future. There was one more reason 
for my receptivity to Toynbee’s ideas that day: 1 had just returned from a 
stay in America, where the urban population problem was already acute.
At about that same time, The Secular City (1965), a book by Harvey 
Cox, a professor of theology at Harvard University, had aroused wide 
interest even beyond the confines of the theological world. It soon became 
the center of a big controversy, which was later recorded in a book, The 
Secular City Debate (1966). The problem of the secular city became a cause 
c&bbre. I shall have to come back to this later, but the problem in broad 
outline is as follows. The concentration of populations in big cities, espe­
cially in America, has led to a situation whereby groups of cities along, for 
example, the Eastern seaboard of the United States—cities from Boston, 
through New Haven, New York, Philadelphia, and all the way to Washing­
ton—show signs of fusing in the future into a long chain which will 
turn the cities into a megalopolis and their society into one of a specifically 
urban nature. The question is, what becomes of religion in such a situation? 
The fact that in such a society religion becomes secularized has been set 
forth as the most fundamental problem. With the secularization of culture 
as a whole, the social structure itself becomes secularized. As a result, 
religious phenomena take on a different meaning. For example, while 
the distinction and opposition between the sacred and profane, long 
considered to be the most basic of religious categories, are eroded, those 
things like religious ceremonies, once held in some sense sacred in that 
society, lose all their meaning.
In such a secularized society, religion cannot maintain the old forms, no 
matter how hard it tries. The flood of secularization is too strong and 
rapid. As a result, the meanings of the church buildings, the holy days, 
and the like undergo a brusque transformation. How can cities survive, 
and, on the other hand, how can religion—especially in Western society,
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Christianity—survive in the midst of such secularization ? That is the prob­
lem.
A few years earlier, John Robinsons’s Honest to God (1963) had already 
tackled the problem from a similar point of view. He used the expression 
“honest to God” in its literal sense of “man sincere in his relationship 
with God.” What standpoint should contemporary man take, he asked, if 
he wants to have such a relationship? This work had a big impact, and 
has gone on to become the best-selling theological work of the century. 
Another book entitled Honest to God Debate (1963), containing the reac­
tions of various scholars to Robinson’s work, has also appeared.
At present, shifts in theological fashion are rapid: changes occur over­
night, almost like the fashions in hemline or hairstyle. Still, the significance 
of the problem broached by Bishop Robinson remains. One could even 
compare his book to a flower blooming before its season; once one flower 
blooms, many others will follow. It is not so much depth of thought we 
find, as a reflection of change in the spiritual climate.
Among the articles collected in the Honest to God Debate is one by 
Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976). He published a separate appraisal of 
Robinson’s ideas, Der Gottesgedanke und der moderne Mensch (The Idea 
of God and Modem Man), which appeared originally in 1963 in a theologi­
cal journal. Although written in response to Robinson’s book, it is, on the 
level of ideas, more important than the work it comments on. It is worth 
noting, then, how Bultmann evaluates the problem introduced by 
Robinson.
Right from the beginning Robinson addresses himself to the great change 
the idea of God has undergone in the mind of modern man. Traditionally, 
God had been thought of as dwelling “in Heaven,” somewhere “up there.” 
But ever since modern man came to see the earth as a round globe rotating 
on its own axis and revolving through space, the up-down distinction lost 
its absolute meaning. The idea of God thus changed, and God’s existence 
came to be placed, not “up there” any more but “out there,” outside, 
in a direction away from the earth. God’s transcendence thus changed its 
direction from above, in the heavens to outside the world. Since Ptolemy’s 
geocentric world view gave way to Copernicus’s heliocentric system, the 
“out there” or “beyond” idea became central, and the symbolism of God 
“up there” lost its potency.
When we reflect carefully on the representations we have today of the 
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Transcendent (no matter how vague these are) and on the concepts which 
common sense relates to it, we cannot help conceding that there is some­
thing in them, even though we may not feel inclined to swallow them 
whole. Robinson contends, however, that the Transcendent, as it exists 
in the contemporary way of thinking—supposing we can still really 
conceive of it today—has turned into something that can no longer be 
adequately expressed by the traditional world “transcendence." For, he 
argues, the Transcendent in the metaphysical sense (at least in the philos­
ophy of modern times) is regarded as something that goes beyond the 
present sensual world, as one pole in the opposition of the Yonder Shore 
(the intellectual, the rational) and the This Shore (the sensual, the material). 
For us today, though, beyondness of this sort is rapidly losing its meaning.
As a matter of fact, Robinson is not alone in this view. He has been 
strongly influenced by Paul Tillich (1886-1965), to the extent that he has 
even been criticized as being too Tillichean. On many points, his idea of 
God can, indeed, be traced back to Tillich’s systematic theology. The 
real reason, then, that Robinson’s ideas caused such a stir lies in the fact 
that he was making his outspoken and provoking statements as a bishop 
of an important See in London. When we look more carefully, we find 
that his thought is not really so new: it has been greatly influenced, not 
only by Bultmann and Tillich, but also by Bonhoeffer, a theologian to 
whom we shall refer later on.
A religious editor of the New York Times met Tillich (shortly before his 
death) in order to hear his opinions on these questions; then he went to 
Germany to interview the elder but still hale giants, Karl Barth (1886-1973) 
and Bultmann; finally, he crossed over to England to meet Robinson and 
several other religious figures. With a reporter’s skill and engaging style, 
he wrote down his findings in an highly interesting book, The New Theolo­
gian (1965) which became a general introduction to the subject. As he 
mentioned in his book, these problematics gave rise in America to the idea 
of the “Death of God," which initiated a new trend in theology. The 
“Death of God" Theology has also been introduced to Japan. It involves 
many problems which must be studied in their own right. One of these, to 
which I will refer in passing later on, is the question of how this theology 
differs from European atheism or nihilism, and in which points it shows 
American characteristics. In Harvey Cox’s The Secular City, the problem 
of atheism is deliberately left untouched in order to think out from an 
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entirely new angle the problem of religion’s meaning in the modern 
secularized world. In his later works, however, Cox approaches the atheism 
of Germany’s Ernst Bloch (1885-1977), whose philosophy, especially as 
expressed in Das Prinzip Hoffnung (The Hope Principle), he then uses as an 
underpinning for his own ideas. But we cannot go into these questions here.
The World and the Beyond: The Hither Shore and the Yonder Shore
Bultmann’s advocacy of “demythologization” (Entmythologisierung) as a 
method for the interpretation of Scripture, which dates from the end of 
the Second World War, is quite well known. He uses the worldview of the 
New Testament as a prime example. In the Bible, the world is presented 
as consisting of three layers: the celestial, the underworld, and the world 
of man. (Robinson calls this the three-storied or three-decker universe.) 
The New Testament posits such a universe on the belief that, within this 
whole, the world of man is frequently visited by suprahuman powers 
coming from the celestial or underworld layers. To cite only one example, 
it is believed that man’s illnesses are the work of evil spirits from the 
underworld. According to Bultmann, a worldview based on that diagram 
is presented by the New Testament as self-evident, but that does not mean 
it belongs to the contents of faith in the sense of being something upon 
which modern man should base his life?
A similar way of thinking is at work in the ideas of Robinson. But 
Robinson is not satisfied, like Bultmann, with simply removing the mytho­
logical constructions of an old worldview. He stresses the point that, in 
each age, the philosophico-scientific worldview and the concepts of God 
(or the Transcendent) must positively correspond to each other. In the 
article quoted above, Bultmann expresses his agreement with Robinson’s
1 Bultmann’s demythologizing process aims at: (a) eradicating this kind of mytho­
logical worldview and view of life, which has lost its relevance in present times, and 
thereby removing from the scriptural content these elements that constitute for modem 
man an unwarranted obstacle to the acceptance of the faith; (b) reinterpreting the 
myth by means of existential philosophy, in these cases where the myth expresses 
something which religious existence experienced on a transcendent level; (c) bringing 
out in fuller relief, by means of these processes, the full shape of the specific “scandal” 
of Christianity. The last point in particular is seen by Bultmann as the central task 
of his Bible exegesis.
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ideas, and goes on to develop, from his own standpoint and in connection 
with the atheism of Nietzsche and Heidegger, his idea of how modern 
man’s concept of God has changed.
I am convinced that all this applies, mutatis mutandis, to the doctrines 
of today’s Shin sect, where we face the question of how to conceive of the 
beyondness of the “Pure Land Paradise in the West.” Also with regard 
to this tenet as expressed in the shihG-rissd (literally, indicating direction 
and setting up form) doctrine, the question of what this Pure Land Para­
dise and its transcendence can mean for modern man from the standpoint 
of Shin faith must be reexamined in a novel and contemporary way.
Robinson honestly confesses that he himself, as a modem man, cannot 
take seriously the idea that God is “up there.” Thence, he tries to rethink 
what it could mean that God is in heaven or again that God is trans­
cendent. And, especially under the influence of Tillich, he concludes that 
God, as a transcendent being, transcends as it were in the direction of the 
depths of the human spirit, rather than transcending to the outside. In 
this way he tries, with Tillich, to think of God as the ground of being.
For Tillich, in his existential-ontological way of thinking, God is, on 
the one hand, the dark but creative “deeper layer” within man’s self- 
awareness, which embraces the realm of the unconscious—including, for 
example, the Jungian collective unconscious—and, on the other hand, 
the ground of being, the transcendent ground of all existence, lying still 
deeper at the bottom of that inwardness. By adopting that way of thinking, 
Robinson tries to locate the question of transcendence at the depths of 
his own inwardness. When we compare Robinson’s ideas with those of 
Tillich, we miss in Robinson that kind of depth, that insight into the 
dynamic structure of the deepest level of existence that we find in Tillich. 
For Tillich, the problem of the ground of being—or, for man, the founda­
tion of life—always implies a sort of ambiguity or mystery. Tillich is always 
conceptually joining two conflicting aspects: on the one hand, the problem 
of his own ground having something terrifying for man, something that 
makes him shrink back when he catches sight of it; on the other, the aspect 
of this ground being that in which man has his source, and the seeing of 
which makes him a true man (Existenz). Robinson does not delve into 
this so deeply. In his thinking of the transcendence at the depths of man, 
he is in a sense much nearer to Bultmann, and it could be said that his 
is an attempt to rationalize Tillich.
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Be that as it may, we can certainly say that God and man unite in a new 
way when God is considered to be acting as the ground of man. The 
traditional representation of heaven could in this sense even be interpreted 
in such a way as to become a symbolic expression of the harmony in the 
foundational unity of God and man. But can we be satisfied with this? 
Buddhists will have to ponder that selfsame problem, though from their 
own distinctive viewpoint.
The question raised above may show us the relevancy of these problem­
atics for Buddhism: Is it allowable, in Pure Land doctrine, to think in such 
a way about the transcendence of the Pure Land Paradise in the West? 
Personally I approach this problem in a rather different way. I am of the 
opinion that, in relation to man, God (or the Transcendent) is indeed 
“up there,*’ a reality dwelling above, or at least implying something which 
makes it unavoidable to symbolize it in that way. For it seems to me that 
as long as man's being is determined by his bodily existence, man cannot 
help thinking of God as being “up there,” even in the face of contempo­
rary physics—that is, even as man’s view of nature acclimatizes itself to 
the relativity theory and atomic physics, the Copernican revolution long 
past.
Also, when it comes to the “world beyond,” the “yonder shore,” or, for 
me as a Pure Land believer of extremely conservative markings, the Pure 
Land Paradise, I cannot help attaching extreme importance to the meaning 
of transcendence implied in the idea of shiho-risso, that all things are 
forms of ultimate truth. For that which is also transcendent (or “yonder 
shore”) to the world, cannot be a transcendent reality in the sense simply 
of God over against man, that is, envisaged exclusively from the viewpoint 
of the man-God relationship. It has to be understood equally in its rela­
tionship to the world—as a world over against a world as well as a Thou 
over against an I. True transcendence necessarily comprises the meaning 
of transcendence over the world. For me, transcendence must always have 
a “Thou” aspect, transcendent with regard to religious Existenz (“I”), 
and, at the same time, an aspect of a yonder shore, transcendent in regard 
to the world.
In his early period, the period of Being and Time (1926) and The Essence 
of Ground (1929), Heidegger saw world-transcendence as human existence 
ecstatically going out of and beyond itself into the world, and the world 
correspondingly opening up in its non-designative truth-totality and be­
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coming world, “worlding.”2 In that way, through Existenz as being-in- 
the-world, the emergence of the historical world is made possible. In the 
early Heidegger, the problem of transcendence is thus considered solely 
from the standpoint of such a self-transcendence. In his later period, 
Heidegger’s thinking is markedly inspired by Greek art, which becomes for 
him the model of reality. He conceives of a halo behind all works of art, 
something like the aureoles or background of light depicted behind the 
Buddha statues. He sees this as the world. Such a world is, of course, a 
place where man can really dwell (wohneri). There man is given from time 
to time a wink from the gods above and, while he dwells on earth as man 
(that is, a being that must die) there is in man’s earthliness something that 
makes it plausible to see a chthonic pulling force at work in him. Bultmann, 
however, as we shall see later, does not accept the interpretation of the 
world as such a Geviert (quadrate or fourfold) harmony of heaven and 
earth, gods and men. It is enough, therefore, to consider here, as premises 
of his existential theology, the transcendence of the Existenz as being-in- 
the-world, and the historicity which this entails.
2 “Non-designative” here stands for Heidegger’s unbedeutsam (insignificant): 
transcending the realm of particular signification—“worlding” refers to “welten,” 
which implies the notion of rotation—Translator's note.
3 “Advene” stands for the Japanese shbrai suru <5, wherein the Heideggerian
meaning of Zu-kunft is taken up: the future as coming towards, the letting-itself- 
come-towards-itself—Translator's note.
Originally, however, the idea of “world-transcendence” implies the idea 
of a world beyond this world, the viewpoint of a world-to-world relation­
ship. The Transcendent, like the Yonder Shore, must contain the aspect 
of being a world beyond, and standing over against this world. Tran­
scendence implies a “from-to” element, which must involve not only a 
transcendence from this shore to the yonder shore, but equally a transcend­
ent working, “advening”3 to this shore from the yonder shore. Transcend­
ence is then bound to be the encounter of these two processes. This is 
how a world-to-world relationship is truly realized.
In brief, the idea of transcendence contains three elements: the Tran­
scendent, Existenz, and the world; and the meaning of a transcendent world 
cannot be omitted from the idea of transcendence. If Jaspers is right in 
viewing the Transcendent and Existenz as a pair, then it must also be said 
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that the Transcendent and the world form a pair. Indeed, within this world- 
to-world relationship it becomes possible to conceive of a truly concrete 
existential “dis-tance.”4 Like a single bridge connecting two shores of a 
river, a bridge of transcendence links the hither shore and the yonder 
shore. That is encounter in the religious sense; from the standpoint of 
Shinran as a religious seeker, it was his encounter with the yoki hito (the 
“good man” or “master who carries grace for me”), Honen. Amida’s 
Sacred Name was thrown as a bridge from the yonder shore to this shore; 
in the dual form of osd (going to the Pure Land) and genso (coming back 
to the samsaric world for the benefit of all living beings).
* Heidegger’s Ent-fernung. Heidegger interprets existential distance as an over­
coming of separation. The Japanese philosopher KOki ShQzS followed him in this.
In speaking of transcendence or beyondness as a world-to-world matter, 
I do not wish to inject surreptitiously a premise of one universe as a spatial 
entity—like Robinson’s “out there”—in which the two worlds would 
relate like mutually relative celestial spheres. I shall explain later, in 
samsara, the realm of animals and the realm of heavenly beings are seen, 
from the viewpoint of the human realm, as events of that realm; seen 
from the realm of animals, men belong to the animal world. Still, between 
those various realms, every one of which is a totality encompassing all the 
others, there is an encounter, within which takes place a “from-to” move­
ment working in world-to-world transcendence.
Let us take the example of encountering a friend in the street. Even here 
we cannot conceive of the encounter by envisaging A and B as two points 
on a straight line, and the distance between A and B shortening ad infini­
tum. From my vantage point, everything, my friend included, lies within 
my range of vision, and from his point of view I fall within his vision. 
The scene in which my friend and 1 greet one another has many possible 
scenarios. He may be aware of me long before I am aware of him; or he 
may come into my range of vision first and see me only after sensing my 
eye on him; or we may catch sight of one another at the same time. And 
a meeting is a meeting only insofar as it allows of different attitudes: I 
can, for example, avoid his gaze or I can welcome it. If my seeing took in 
images as purely as the eye of a camera, and if the meeting of persons were 
like two objects bumping into each other in physical space, there could 
be no question of transcendence or encounter in the religious sense.
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Therefore, I have come—as I shall explain later on—to regard the meaning 
of transcendence as a meeting between a world of a lower order and a 
world of a higher order, whereby one part of that lower world becomes 
nonetheless the place of the encounter of both worlds.
I can perhaps summarize my way of thinking in this way: transcendence 
must include the idea of a world over against the world, a Yonder Shore 
over against This Shore. At the basis of this conception of world transcend­
ence, in connection with which the problem of the finitude of man and 
his world is considered, lies the idea of a “Paradise in the West.” For me 
(and it can be argued that I myself am hereby demythologizing the mean­
ing of the Pure Land in the West), this means that we must consider fully 
what is signified by the symbol of such a Pure Land, and by this symbol 
alone, namely, at the same time transcendence as world-transcendence, 
the transcendence of the world by finite beings and the corresponding 
advening movement of a transcendent world and Transcendent Other. This 
also reflects on the meaning of God orBuddha: as long as man is what he 
is and lives in the world, every world transcendence must, in some sense, 
imply the meaning of a “Paradise in the West.”
In his Being and Having, Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) writes that the 
human body must be considered in line with the Christian concept of 
Divine Incarnation. That way of thinking strikes me as very deep and ex­
tremely enlightening. Referring this to our present problem, it could mean 
that, in the very fact of man’s existing as such a corporeal being, as such a 
“being-in-the-world,” lies the necessity for God to be, with respect to 
man, in some sense up there. That God is “above” is for me a bodily reve­
lation. As long as the place of the world-to-world encounter is my body— 
as long as man walks the earth in an upright position and looks up at the 
heavens—God must reveal himself as fundamentally “above.”5 He cannot 
reveal himself in any other way.
5 In Japanese, the words for “god” ££ and “above” h have the same pronuncia­
tion: kami.
Similarly, as long as man lives in the world and relates to it as a being 
opened to the world through bodily existence, a Transcendent that is truly 
transcendent to the world must be thought of as “advening” from the 
future into the present in the form of an advent of a transcendent reality. 
In other words, world transcendence is something that, while transcending.
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“advenes”: becoming present in the present from the future in the form of 
a coming from the transcendent yonder shore world into the present world. 
I am convinced that true transcendence is that which emerges into the 
present as something advening in a real transcendence towards us. For me, 
therefore, the symbol of the Pure Land in the West is extremely meaningful; 
it carries a weight of meaning that cannot be shaken or replaced by any 
other symbol.
The New Form of Religious Awareness
In spite of all this, it remains true that in a world of especially vehement 
secularization—in the present world which, science at the vanguard, is 
busily secularizing us all—some policy must be devised in order to reach 
a new understanding of the meaning of traditional religious symbols.
Among scholars of the Jodo Shin sect of the last one hundred years, 
Soga Ryojin (1875-1971) was undoubtedly possessed of the strongest 
speculative powers. In April 1961, in a colloquium held on Mount Hiei 
to commemorate the 700th anniversary of sect founder Shinran Shonin’s 
death, Soga declared that “the ‘body’ does not change; only the ‘manifesta­
tion* does.”6
6 Soga uses the categories tai {£(body, quidditas) and gi (manifestation, modus)— 
Translator's note.
I for one have difficulty with this formulation. Let us consider the 
problem in concrete terms through the example provided by Bishop 
Robinson himself. Robinson writes that as a priest in the contemporary 
world, holding an important position in the Church, he finds that he 
cannot really pray any more. This extremely honest and frank admission 
strikes us as the authentic voice from the depths of a man’s soul, and 
arouses our sympathy. It is like a Shin believer being unable to invoke 
Amida’s Name any longer because of the manner of life in the
modern secularized world. The nembutsu, however, should be something 
that “does not choose between moving or standing still, sitting or lying 
down. It should be amenable to any time, place, or occasion.” This 
means that its recitation does not require that one brings one’s heart to 
transparency first in a solitary and quiet place. Over against the idea that 
a specially consecrated time and place—prerequisites of all traditional
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religious rites—are the only locus for the realization of the Holy, the spirit 
of the nembutsu in both Honen and Shinran is precisely such a realization 
of the Holy in the midst of the secular, within the everyday behavior of 
“moving or standing still, sitting or lying down.”
Still, reciting the nembutsu in a streetcar, or saying “Namu Amida 
Butsu” in a coffee shop at the moment when the waitress brings you your 
coffee, is after all a bit awkward. On the other hand, it does not sound 
strange at all to see an old lady saying “Namu Amida Bu” while being 
served green tea in a tea house. Why is it awkward to do exactly the same in 
a coffee house? Something, somewhere, must be out of joint.
Soga Ryojin says that the “body,” the nembutsu as substance, does not 
change; but in this technological age of ours it rather looks as if the “body” 
itself undergoes change and is being progressively corroded. From the 
standpoint of the “body,” no contradiction should be felt over saying 
Namu Amida Butsu in a coffee house. On the contrary, the spirit of the 
nembutsu demands just such a locale. It is still possible to maintain that 
this kind of awkwardness is due to the change in “manifestation”. But 
when the problem presents itself in the acute form of prayer becoming 
impossible in the midst of secularized life, we cannot help concluding that 
this change in “manifestation” implies also a change in “body.” To bor­
row one of Robinson’s expressions, the God of modem man has become 
“a Grandfather in heaven, a kindly Old Man who could be pushed into 
one comer while they got on with the business of life.”7 This certainly 
indicates a change in God’s “body” in a prayerless world.
7 John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (London, 1963), p. 41.
That the image of such a “Daddy-God” is a blasphemy was pointed 
out with great perspicacity by Spren Kierkegaard (1813-1855). Writing 
about the faith of his fiancde, Regine Olsen, he remarked that Regine’s 
God was like a doting uncle who at Christmas time is good for a few pres­
ents. The picture is, then, that of a softhearted man, a kind uncle some­
where in another town whom it is nice to have because from time to time 
he gives us the things we desire. But God has then ceased to be an imme­
diate reality, a serious matter that has to do with our every daily act (our 
“moving and standing still, sitting and lying down”). No longer is he 
someone who in my prayer enters into earnest dialogue and negotiation 
with me. He has become a remote being that comes like a breeze for only 
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an occasional visit. But what man has to establish, and establish in the 
midst of this secular age, is not such a spineless relation with a grandfa­
ther God, but a true relationship with a true God. How can and must man 
as a man truly pray to God? That is the object of Robinson’s quest.
Robinson was led to questioning of this kind mainly by the influence of 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945). As he was killed in a Nazi prison at the 
age of thirty-nine, it is often said that Bonhoeffer’s thinking did not have 
sufficient time to mature, that his assertions are full of contradictions, and 
a good deal of what he says even incomprehensible. Robinson believes, 
however, that his thought represents a profound testimony of our age, and 
that we will need many more years to really understand its message. He 
voices a particular approval of Bonhoeffer’s idea of a “beyond within,” 
a “beyond in the midstof our life.” In Pure Land doctrine this corresponds 
to heizei-gojo, the accomplishing or attaining of faith in daily life.8 In both 
the Transcendent is found in the midst of present reality, and what is not 
found among the things of actual reality is not the true Transcendent. 
It is also Bonhoeffer’s contention that for man to live with Jesus Christ 
as such a Transcendent is the truth of Christianity. It naturally follows 
that he does not admit of any relationship with the Transcendent apart 
from that just described. That is why Bonhoeffer attempts to go beyond 
all traditional interpretations (those of his master Karl Barth included) 
which accept as a premise Christianity as a Church-centered religion.
8 This is the idea that the authenticity of the believer’s faith is not first attested to at 
the hour of death, by entering the Pure Land with feelings of gratitude and an un­
troubled heart, but that true faith must realize and prove itself every day, in the midst 
of daily life.
Karl Barth, too, asserts that Christianity is not a religion. But for him 
the term “religion” means the belief that man can attain and grasp God 
or the Holy self-centeredly and by his own power, and consists in the 
attempt to do exactly that. This, as he sees it, pertains to all religions except 
Christianity. For him, the task of theology is to elucidate, in the name of 
the Church and according to the needs of every age, the truth of the 
Gospel entrusted to the Church. Consequently, Church-centeredness 
becomes the first premise for the whole of theology, the totality of its 
content. Bonhoeffer, on the other hand, maintains that Christianity was 
not a religion in the beginning, when it appeared in the ancient world
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in its primitive form. From the standpoint of the Hellenistic world and 
the concept of religion current in the Greco-Roman mind, the original 
doctrines of Christianity were viewed as extremely secular, profane, even 
shameless.
What thus appeared to non-Christians as a “scandal” beyond the 
common-sense bounds of religion—from whatever viewpoint: the ritual, 
the moral, or the philosophical—was accepted by the Christians in all 
simplicity as their God. On the other hand, in the present secularized 
world, Christianity, no matter how hard it tries, cannot sustain the Church. 
What, then, is to be done? It is Bonhoeffer’s conviction that we have to 
conceive means to communicate the new contents of Christian faith in a 
secular language, a totally new form with new words—a language that 
might sound almost immoral to the pious ears of those contemporaries 
wedded closely to the traditional ways of thinking.
Robinson makes that conviction his own, and his thought is further in­
fluenced by Tillich’s theology and Bultmann’s theory of demythologiza­
tion. It could be said that his combining of these three, especially around 
Bultmann’s idea of the proclamation of the Gospel (kerygma), represents 
a personal reflection on his own religious faith. The ideas of Bultmann 
which influence Robinson so much gave rise, especially in Germany and 
America, to a new theological trend which has come to be called the 
post-Bultmann school, which Ebeling and Fuchs represent very actively. 
Ebeling, especially, gives a theological presentation of the essence of 
Protestant Christianity by means of a new hermeneutics that are a further 
development of Bultmann’s methods. While Ebeling was deeply influenced 
by his master Bultmann, we see from the outstanding treatise on 
Bonhoeffer in his book Wort und Glaube (Word and Faith, 1960) that he 
was also influenced by Bonhoeffer. In his other works, Das Wesen des 
Christlichen Glaubens (The Essence of the Christian Faith, 1959), for 
example, Ebeling sets forth his own standpoint with the utmost clarity 
and leads us to think that there is a marked difference between his way 
of thinking and that of Bultmann. But I cannot go into these matters here.
Comparing Bultmann and his disciples, it appears after all that the 
master stands head and shoulders above them all, and everything indi­
cates that in the foreseeable future the problems he raised and the theses 
he defended will continue to influence the theological world.
For Bultmann, kerygma is the central idea. When he considers the 
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problems of history in general, he always focuses on the world as the scene 
of the salvific event and, especially, on the historical Existenz in the world. 
Even in his most universal speculations, he never strays an inch from the 
existential standpoint. For him, the historical world by itself is forever 
relative and the meanings which we can grasp there irretrievably 
fragmentary and relative, so that nothing absolute can appear anywhere in 
it. Consequently, the history that we are aware of (and investigate in the 
science of history) cannot obtain any ultimate meaning as a whole. If a 
total meaning can be found in history, it is, in his opinion, only through 
the history of the individual as a person and the self-understanding involved 
therein. Put more concretely, history seems to obtain its structure or plot 
through the person of Jesus Christ. But for the present, it is enough to 
emphasize that a person is invariably required as a core, and that around 
that core history crystallizes and comes to posses a total structure as 
history. Only through the mediation of a historical existence does a total 
meaning and direction become apparent in history.
And this kind of historical existence, and likewise the world as the 
“seat” of this existence, realizes itself only on the basis of an encounter 
with the kerygma. For through the mediation of the decision of the religious 
existence, this encounter brings the subject to its fulfilment as historical 
existence, brings the world therein to unity, and, finally, brings out the 
ultimate significance of history.
History and Nature
In 1961, during my stay at Marburg, I had the good fortune of meeting 
with Bultmann frequently. He was then seventy-seven years old, but he 
was still gifted with very lively speculative powers. On one of these occa­
sions, Bultmann took down from his bookshelves a commentary on the Zen 
“Oxherding Pictures,”9 in a German translation by Tsujimura Koichi,
9 This booklet tells the story—in ten pictures, to which explanatory poems by 
master Kuo-an and others are added—of an oxherd looking for a stray cow, up to the 
moment that he brings it back home. It shows, in the form of a parable, the process 
of the quest for the true mind of the self. Towards the end, the cow has become com­
pletely docile, so that the oxherd returns home sitting on the back of the cow and 
playing a flute, without even bothering anymore about the tether. From that point on, all 
concern for the cow is forgotten. The German translation alluded to is Der Ochs und 
sein Hine, translated by K&ichi Tsqjimura and Hartmut Buchner (Pfullingen, 1958).
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a professor of philosophy at Kyoto University, and said:
“This is an admirable book. What is explained here is the same as is 
taught in Christianity. In my understanding, the ox stands for the human 
heart. Chasing this ox must mean the quest for the true self. Pursuing the 
true self means forgetting the self; the self becomes the true self only when 
it is forgotten. In the Oxherding Pictures, this is presented in an extraor­
dinarily clever way, but the content does not differ practically from Chris­
tian truth. The only difference is that history does not appear in it. I do not 
find the idea, so strong in Christianity, that truth is realized in history.”
I replied with a remark that certainly betrays the influence of Nishitani 
Keiji on my thinking: “Indeed, history may not be present in this work, 
but is it not equally true that, in Christian, especially Protestant, doctrine, 
Nature is absent?”
Bultmann then asked me what I understood by “Nature.” I answered 
that I meant existential Nature, the Nature that must be present when ex­
istence becomes true existence and not nature that comes under the 
spatialized categories of abstract time and space—what existential philos­
ophers would call “the vulgar world concept.” I then asked again if it 
was not true that this existential Nature did not appear clearly enough in 
Christian doctrine. After a moment’s reflection, Bultmann answered in 
the affirmative. He then inquired how I interpreted existential Nature. 
At that moment, I recalled his interpretation of the bodily resurrection of 
Jesus Christ. According to Saint Paul, resurrection is meaningless if it 
is not bodily resurrection; he goes so far as to say that if Christ did not rise 
up (in the flesh), his own faith would be in vain. While treating Paul’s 
theology in his Theology of the New Testament, I,10 Bultmann explains these 
passages by making a distinction between the Greek word sarx, meaning 
the “flesh,” or body of sin, and soma, meaning the body of resurrection. In 
the English translation, this distinction is rendered by two words, “flesh” 
and “body.” The “resurrection in the flesh” (in ordinary parlance) then 
means resurrection in the soma and not in the sarx. Soma, according to 
Bultmann, is the locus where the real truth manifests itself. With these 
recollections in mind, I replied: “If you want an example of the existential 
meaning of Nature, would not the way you conceive of the corporality
10 Translated by Kedrick Grobel (London, 1952). The original work, Theologie 
des neuert Testaments, was published in 1948.
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of the risen Christ, the soma as the place of the resurrection, be a good 
example of that existential Nature?” This time, Bultmann was lost in 
thought for quite a time, and then, referring to Heidegger’s conception of 
the Geviert (the quadrate or fourfold),11 inquired whether my conception 
of Nature resembled this “Geviert”—which Heidegger had started using 
at just about that time as a symbol of the world.
11 I alluded to this earlier. In brief, it is the idea that sky and earth, gods and 
mortals are bound together into oneness, and all four mirror each other. This is then 
symbolized by the quadrate, the square, or the fourfold.
Since I had been strongly influenced by these Heideggerian ideas, I had 
to say that my thought on the subject came near to that of Heidegger. 
Bultmann declared that he was against that way of thinking. He explained 
his objection by saying that although this Geviert is a world wherein truth 
is disclosed, there is no place in it for a true encounter with a Thou. At 
the moment it struck me that this critique of Heidegger was altogether 
typical of Bultmann. His remarks have stayed with me to this day. Not 
to be satisfied with the idea of the Fourfold or “world-openness” through 
which the later Heidegger deepened his awareness of the world, but to 
struggle earnestly for a congenial conception of the necessity of the en­
counter with a Thou, and proceed from this encounter to conceive of 
history in its full sense—this, in my opinion, is an inevitable outcome, 
given Bultmann’s standpoint.
If I may be allowed a personal word of interpretation on Bultmann’s 
view, I would say that his “decision in faith,” with the world as its media­
tion and the place of its conversion, wants to exchange the traditional idea 
of a historical transmission of the revelation (God’s Word) in the past 
for that of a here-and-now encounter with the Gospel kerygma that ad­
venes from the future. With the world as its mediation, history can thus 
spread into world history from the individual history of the Existenz, and 
the being-in-the-world of the existence can become the religious existence 
that makes its decision in the historical world. Consequently, the full 
meaning of history can strictly speaking only be conceived of through the 
meaning of religious existence as a being in the historical world. And it is 
the “we/ren” (with its implication of rotation) of this world that con­
stitutes the encounter for our religious existence, by giving the existence of 
Jesus Christ in the past a cyclic turn and making us meet the Christ event as
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something advening into the present from the future. In other words, 
through the mediation of the world, the past-to-present direction is 
switched to a future-to-present one, and therein the encounter with the 
Word of God may come about.
In the case of the Buddha’s Name as well, the two movements come 
into being together. I encounter, here and now, Amida’s Name advening as 
eternity from the Pure Land. This occurs in the form of an I-Thou en­
counter in the actual present, with the Name (as the Thou) advening from 
the future. And on the other hand, at the moment of this encounter, by the 
religious act of “Namu Amida Butsu” as a decision which brings evocation 
and response into unison, the symbolic world (in which all Buddhas are 
praising the Name of Amida Buddha and guaranteeing the truth of that 
Name and birth in the Pure Land through its invocation) is discovered 
directly underfoot.
In even more concrete form, this symbolic world, the background 
for man’s encounter with the Name, also signifies the opening up of the 
world in which the nembutsu is historically transmitted. This means, in 
turn, just as in Heidegger’s fcwert, the realization of the world of all 
Buddhas praising and guaranteeing Amida’s Name—a world wherein 
everything mirrors everything else. And precisely in this world, just as in 
Bultmann’s historical world, the encounter with the Thou, the meeting 
with the Name, obtains. In that sense, we find here, in a concrete form, a 
synthesis of the standpoints of these two thinkers.
In the second chapter of the Kyogyoshinsho, entitled “True Living,” 
Shinran Shonin calls the Seventeenth Vow (or Prayer) “the Vow of the 
praise of all Buddhas, the Vow of the utterance in praise of the Name by 
all Buddhas.” This means that all Buddhas praise Amida Buddha and 
exalt his Name; that is, by pronouncing his Name, all Buddhas praise 
Amida. Understandably, this is generally interpreted as referring not to 
our recitation of Amida’s Name, but to an event belonging to the absolute 
world in which “Namu Amida Butsu” occurs on the side of the Dharma 
(hottai Myogo)—something taking place among the Buddhas in their 
Buddha-worlds transcendent to the world of man. In other words, it is a 
matter of all Buddhas praising one another and exalting the Name of 
Amida.
If that were the whole truth, however, it would be difficult to see how 
this praise by the Buddhas relates to our own religious practice of the 
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nembutsu. Right at the beginning of the same “True Living” chapter, 
Shinran says clearly: “The Great Living is to pronounce the Name of the 
Tathagata of Unimpeded Light.” I would like to interpret this term 
“Great Living” as religious or symbolic activity, in which the practice 
whereby all Buddhas praise Amida’s Name is mirrored in the practice 
whereby we, on our side, “pronounce the Name of the Tathagata of 
Unimpeded Light.” Here, we are aware that our recital of the Name is 
praise and exaltation of the Name. And our recital of the Name is, in turn, 
mirrored in the praise of all the Buddhas. This makes it clear that the “Vow 
of the praise of all Buddhas” is the “Prayer in which All Buddhas pro­
nounce the Name.”12
12 The exact wording at the beginning of chapter two of the Kyogydshinsho is: 
"As I reverently reflect on the outgoing eko, I find therein the great living and the great 
faith." [The adjective great has been added to living (practice) and faith with the 
intent of exalting them. Eko, or merit-transference, has two directions: the “outgoing 
phase” (dsd) is the direction from us to the Buddha; the “coming phase” (genso) 
is the direction from the Buddha to all living beings (insofar as it is thought of 
relatively, over against dso). Merit-transference is the working of Amida Buddha’s 
Compassion in the form of the Name; the working of an absolute love, whereby the 
Buddha’s substantiality and totality are, as such, handed down to our side. In this 
working there is an “outgoing phase” and a “coming phase.” Living (practice) and 
faith are both discussed from the viewpoint of the “outgoing phase.”]
The Kyogyoshinsho text reads further: "The great living is to pronounce the Name 
of the Nyorai of Unimpeded Light. In this living are embraced all good things and all 
the roots of merit. They are instantly perfected (as soon as the Name is pronounced). 
[In other words, the ultimate desire of man is promptly fulfilled therein.) The Name 
is the treasure-ocean of the merits accruing from the absolute reality of Suchness. [The 
Name is the absolute truth as Suchness; it is the ocean of merit wherein this truth is 
realized as it is, in a unique and unduplicatable way.) Therefore, it is called the great 
living.
"So it is that this great living issues out of the Prayer (or Pbw) of Absolute Compassion, 
for which reason the Prayer is known as that which is praised by all Buddhas, or that 
in which all Buddhas pronounce the Name, or as that which is heartily applauded by all 
Buddhas."
[The “True Living” chapter, indeed, explains the text of the Seventeenth Vow (or 
Prayer) further as a Prayer that the Name shall be uttered in praise by all Buddhas.)
"In The Larger Sutra of Eternal Life (vol. I), we find:
'If, upon my attaining Buddhahood, all the innumerable Buddhas in the ten quarters 
were not approvingly to pronounce my Name, may I not attain the Supreme Enlight­
enment.' ” (D. T. Suzuki trans.)
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In other words, the Pure Land and this world, all Buddhas and all living 
beings, the cosmic chorus sounding the Name throughout the Ten Quarters 
and the career of the historical nembutsu on earth, form, in this symbolic 
action, a locus of Geviert. At this point occurs the encounter of Amida and 
me. Symbolic action of this sort can be called, with Jaspers, absolute 
action, wherein all opposition of subject and object melts away and con­
crete reality appears in its purity on the standpoint of action. It is precisely 
there that the encounter and mutual evocation of I and Thou are realized.
This standpoint of action must certainly be explored further in connec­
tion with Nishida Kitard’s view of Action-Intuition and Tanabe Hajime’s 
elucidation of action from the viewpoint of Practice-Faith, but it seems to 
me equally relevant to the difference in viewpoint just mentioned between 
Heidegger and Bultmann. In any case, in my opinion, the “Namu Amida 
Butsu” which comes forth at the point where the opposition of subject and 
object is overcome, in the “Great Living” characteristic of religious action, 
shows an extraordinary depth. And its significance for the present day may 
become much clearer when explored in the light of the contemporary 
problematics of philosophy of religion and theology.
Translated by Rev. Jan Van Bragt
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